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Abstract Like the other chapters dedicated to one speciﬁc neighbourhood, this one
begins by highlighting the demographic, economic and environmental stakes of the
Northern neighbourhood. It raises the following questions: Whom does the Arctic
region belong to? In other words, under what condition could the Arctic become an
international common good, and what could the role of Europe be in this regard.
Then it analyses the opportunities, risks and governance challenges connected to
climate change. The chapter ends with strategic recommendations: as a difﬁculty
emerges from the fact that the European part of the Northern neighbourhood
belongs to various European territorial cooperation programmes, this calls for a
more uniﬁed and ambitious EU strategy on this neighbourhood. Moreover, we
emphasize that Russia is one of the key stakeholders in the Northern neighbour-
hood; in particular the Northern Dimension constitutes an important venue for a
better dialogue with the Russian neighbour.
3.1 Stakes
In order to show the structures and dynamics of the Northern neighbourhood’s
space it is crucial to highlight its sparse settlement structure and long distances. Due
to limited number of population in the Faroe Islands and Greenland (later referred to
as “Westnorden”) we use those at national level (Map 3.1).
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Due to the extreme climate this neighbourhood is sparsely populated and has a small
population size. Greenland and Nenets autonomous okrug (AO) in Russia have the
smallest population in the neighbourhood (56,000 and 43,000 respectively).
Densities are extremely low (0.026/km2 in Greenland and 0.24/km2 in Nenets AO).
The most populated areas are Russian northern regions (Arkhangelskaya oblast).
Several cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants in the Russian area. The largest
cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants are Arkhangelsk, Murmansk,
Petrozavodsk and Syktyvkar, which are the administrative centres and capital cities
of oblast or Republic (Republic of Karelia and of Komi). More than 90 % of the
population of Greenland and Murmansk oblast live in urban centres; the share of
urban population is also very high in other northern regions of Russia. Due to
difﬁcult climatic conditions, low accessibility and a limited access to services (e.g.
health care and education), urban centres are becoming more attractive to live in.
The majority of the area has experienced a population decline over the last
decade. In 2010, negative net migration was observed in the whole Russian part of
the neighbourhood, except for Nenets AO (enormous development potential of the
oil and gas extraction industry and increased investments in infrastructure devel-
opment). Against the background of an overall drop in population, a slight popu-
lation increase of 0.7–1.2 % from 2002 to 2012 was observed in the Faroe Islands,
Map 3.1 Transport networks in the Northern neighbourhood (situation in 2010)
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as well as in Yamalo-Nenets and Nenets AO in Russia. Population growth in the
Russian regions can be attributed to increasing oil and gas exploration here. In
Nenets AO, oil and gas now constitutes 99 % of all industrial activity;
Yamalo-Nenets AO accounts for 90 % of Russia’s natural gas production.
Mobility is high. People are moving towards the regional centres and larger urban
nodes within the area but also abroad, to the more populated areas in the West, East
and South of the neighbourhood. A remarkable share of the migration is related to the
limited labour possibilities in the home regions and in the case of more rural and
peripheral regions, in relation to education possibilities. The fly in-fly out phe-
nomenon is common in some settlements, especially in those where the economic
structure is heavily concentrated on natural resource exploitation: when settlements do
not otherwise offer sufﬁcient quality to attract families to live locally, employees are
flown to the work site where they work, usually long shifts for a number of contin-
uous days and are then flown back to their home town for a number of days of rest.
3.1.2 Socio-economic
As to the gender balance of the population in the far North, the male population of
working age is slightly predominant, particularly in Greenland and Murmansk
oblast. This can be explained by development of strongly male-dominant industries:
oil and gas exploration ﬁelds, mining activities, military bases, construction and
forestry. Employment possibilities for females are quite limited and available
mainly in larger urban centres.
When it comes to the total gender balance including all age groups, the proportion
of females is signiﬁcantly higher, except for Greenland. Adult males have higher
death rates than females; this is exacerbated in the Northern neighbourhood due to
tough work environment, harsh climate, low quality of housing, inconsistent and
poor quality of health care and excessive consumption of alcohol among the male
population (Socpol 2013). In the case of Greenland, the dominance of male popu-
lation can be explained by high emigration of female population from the country.
Thus, life expectancy is not that high, especially for indigenous peoples. Life
expectancy for women is only 71–75 years in Yamalo-Nenets AO, to be compared
to 75–80 in the Faroe Islands. The neighbourhood is characterized by a relatively
high share of children, particularly in Greenland, Faroe Islands, and in Nenets AO
(high birth rate among the indigenous population). As one might expect the share of
elderly is low (6–12 % of the population) due to shorter life expectancy and
out-migration of retired residents; for comparison, in the Eastern neighbourhood the
respective indicator is above 12 % in all areas except in the Caucuses.
GDP is the highest in Yamalo-Nenets AO, due to gas extraction activities.
In GDP per capita, Nenets AO is dominant (the highest among all Russian regions,
about 7–8 times above the country average), followed by Yamalo-Nenets AO (also
narrowly specialized and based on exploitation of raw resources), Greenland and
Faroe Islands.
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3.1.3 Environmental
The Arctic is under major environmental threat from a multitude of changes hap-
pening in the climate. Without major reductions in global carbon emissions, the
Barents Sea will be completely ice free by 2050; this will have implications for the
habitat and many other ice-associated organisms. The amount of annual average
Arctic sea ice decreased over the period from 1979 to 2012 with a rate of more than
50 % for summer perennial sea ice. The spatial extent has decreased in every
season, and in every successive decade since 1979 (high conﬁdence) (IPCC 2013).
Map 3.2 shows the projected changes in 2090 based on Arctic climate impact
assessment data from 2004; it shows the surface temperatures over land, the size of
the polar ice cap, and the outer limits of permafrost.
There is an extraordinary increase in the sea surface temperature over the last
three decades. The regional effects of climate change have already been observed in
the region as the most severe effects of global warming have already been occurring
Map 3.2 Projected change in the Arctic climate. Source Protecting Arctic biodiversity, limitations
and strengths of environmental agreements, GRID Arendal-A centre collaborating with UNEP
84 L. Van Well et al.
faster in the Arctic than anywhere else on earth—almost twice the global average
since 1980. IPCC predictions from 2013 indicate that the Arctic region will warm
more rapidly than the global mean, and mean warming over land will be greater
than over the ocean.
Early predicted models indicate that the Arctic will be ice-free during the
summer by 2100; more recent studies predict that this will occur as early as 2035
(UNEP 2013). Hence, the region is extremely vulnerable to climate change. Arctic
coastal communities and services are at risk of increasing threats of storms and
shore erosion; almost all villages are already in search of relocation. Melting ground
is putting transportation and the construction of infrastructure such as roads and
buildings in danger. Thus far, melting of the Arctic ice cap has led to increased
marine access and coastal wave action, changes in vegetation and fauna as well as
changes in coastal ecology and biological diversity and production.
3.2 The Arctic: A Remote but Increasingly Compelling
Neighbourhood for the EU
3.2.1 To Whom Does the Arctic Region Belong?
The Arctic region is one of the few places on earth that has not yet been nationally
deﬁned so there is no uniform deﬁnition of the region. Several deﬁnitions exist from
natural science, cultural and political boundaries perspectives. For instance there is a
cultural deﬁnition of the Arctic that includes the areas inhabited by indigenous Arctic
peoples and their traditional hunting grounds, beyond the Arctic Circle. The region is
made up of Arctic Ocean sovereign states: United States, Canada, Greenland, Russia,
Iceland, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, even though Finland, Iceland and Sweden
have no territorial borders on the Arctic Ocean. On the other hand two of the Nordic
countries, Denmark (via Greenland and Faroe Islands) and Norway (via Svalbard)
together with the United States, Russia and Canada are considered as the Arctic Five.
Arctic resources were not clearly divided between countries at the outset. The
Arctic catchment zone is now claimed by at least this Arctic ﬁve. The Arctic is very
complex in terms of its geological structure and mostly uncharted. The Spitsbergen
Treaty in 1920 acknowledged Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, but gave
mineral rights to various countries. For instance, Russia and Norway today continue
to mine and export coal in the region. China, Japan, South Korea and India have
funded scientiﬁc missions in the region.
The international catchment zone (the Arctic seabed) is beyond the national
jurisdiction limits and supposedly rich in minerals. The waters beyond the territorial
waters of the coastal states are considered as international waters. Activities in
international waters are expected to be carried out in the collective interests of all
states, and beneﬁts are expected to be shared equitably.
The seabed beyond the exclusive economic zones and conﬁrmed extended con-
tinental shelf claims are considered to be the “heritage of all mankind” (Declaration of
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Principles Governing the Seabed—1970 and Law of the Sea treaty) and administered
by the UN International Seabed Authority. The Arctic is governed by international
customarymaritime law through theUnitedNations Convention on theLawof the Sea
(UNCLOS), and cooperation is led by the Arctic Council, in addition to bilateral
agreements between states with competing claims (Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009).
3.2.2 Organisation of Space: The Key Role of Air Transport
There are only a handful of big cities and towns where the majority of the Arctic
population is concentrated. The settlements with a population above 50,000
inhabitants can be found in the Nordic countries, north-western Russia, Iceland and
Alaska. In north-western Russia big urban centres emerged mainly due to devel-
opment of resource extraction sector and to establishment of the North Sea Fleet in
case of Murmansk (Megatrends 2011). About one third of the Arctic population
lives in small and scattered settlements with a population of less than 5000
inhabitants; their livelihood is based on the utilisation of local natural resources
(ﬁsheries, forestry, hunting and gathering, herding). These communities are highly
dispersed and comprise numerous cultural and ethnic groups (Rasmussen et al.
2013). Although the region has become more accessible due to development of
modern transportation, infrastructure remains scattered across huge territories.
Infrastructure development is, in many cases, linked to the distribution and access
to natural resources and their value. The communities in the Arctic today are, to a
large extent, dependent on air transport. Air routes mainly connect the peripheral
areas with the largest urban centres, while accessibility to the small settlement
remains extremely low. In this regard, smaller settlements have the worst access to
necessary means and variety of services, including health care and education.
The region’s economy is based on natural resources and their exploitation, which
are not evenly spread across the region. In Nenets region, Labrador, Faroe Islands and
Svalbard, the primary sectors account for about 20–40 % of employment. In terms of
value, petroleum is the most important resource in the Arctic. Already in the begin-
ning of the 2000s 16 % of the world’s petroleum and 25 % of natural gas originated
from theArctic; 10%ofworld’s wild ﬁshwas caught in theArctic.Moreover, 10%of
world’s supply of nickel, cobalt, palladium, apatite and platinum comes from the
Arctic. Among other resources in the region valuable for the worldwide markets are
diamonds, gold and zinc. Besides minerals, oil and gas, the forestry sector provides a
steady income and offers employment in these regions (Map 3.3).
The traditional economic activities, such as hunting, ﬁsheries and herding still
play important role for the northern communities in Iceland, Faroe Islands, Norway
and Greenland. These renewable resources are mainly locally consumed
(Rasmussen et al. 2013).
It is expected that most categories of tourism will flourish, particularly
land-based tourism and large cruise shipping. An important favouring factor for the
expansion of any economic activities is related to projected extension of the nav-
igation season.
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3.2.3 The Impact of the Climate Change: Opportunities,
Risks and Governance Challenges
The impacts of climate change, thinning sea ice and melting permafrost have started
to unsettle the geographies of Arctic governance and created a new agenda. These
Map 3.3 Generation of electricity by main sources in the Arctic region
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include management of the “new” environment, oil and gas exploration, trade,
economic development, discussion of a legal framework, most importantly; gov-
ernance and security. As the region undergoes a vast transformation, new states and
political entities wish to become involved in the governance.
Due to increased accessibility of vast mineral, hydrocarbon and ﬁshing resour-
ces, national security interests will be focusing on the future development of the
region. The melting of the ice cap tends to initiate a number of scenarios all related
to a potential conflict between the Arctic coastal states concerning maritime border
disputes (Hong 2012). Furthermore, there is an emerging interest of non-Arctic
states in shipping and polar research which is adding indeﬁnite elements to the
geopolitical development of the Arctic.
The potential hydrocarbon mine of the region holds a great potential for local
communities in terms of economic beneﬁt. While detailed information on Arctic
petroleum resources still remains limited, the proportion of natural gas to oil in the
region’s hydrocarbon resources is three times more (US Geological Survey 2008).
Besides hydrocarbon resources, when Arctic ice disappears, new shipping will
reduce the maritime distances between the continents of Europe and Asia, providing
strategic alternatives to other countries such as Japan, which would have an interest
in Arctic access owing to its current dependence on shipping through the Strait of
Malacca for most of its energy supplies.
Regarding security questions, the presence and role of the military will have to
adapt to the new conditions; as the region becomes more accessible there will be
more capacity for operations such as border patrolling, submarine activities, search
and rescue. This will also require adaptation in terms of management of resources
as monitoring of the waters will be of interest to the Arctic states. Since May 2011,
all the member states of the Arctic Council have comprehensive Arctic strategies
where they share some overall objectives. Different organisations and forums show
consensus on the general need for international cooperation on Arctic affairs and for
international governance of the Arctic. Nordic countries might have different views:
while Norway has emphasized NATO’s role, Finland, Denmark and Sweden
consider the role of the EU as important. But they all place strong emphasis on the
central role of the Arctic Council; with a wider mandate to new observers, the
Council would be the natural place for such efforts.
Is the Council resistant enough to accommodate the on-going changes? In order
to attract international investment for energy and mining projects, a clear legal
framework will be needed as it would be central to the management of ﬁsheries, oil
and gas exploration as well as to national and energy security issues. It would also
be central to the operation of commercial shipping and the management of possible
accidents that may occur beyond national boundaries, along with any other
potential activities that may arise. But the governance pattern is not easy to ﬁgure
out; Asian powers, including China and Southern Korea, express a strong interest in
being involved in Arctic governance. China gained observer state status at the
Council meeting in Kiruna in 2013 and also has a station on Svalbard. Iceland is the
ﬁrst European country with whom China has a free trade agreement.
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3.2.4 What Role for the EU?
The region has the potential to strengthen international relations between America,
Russia, Asia and the EU. The European Union has recently developed focus on an
Arctic policy. Although the EU’s territorial presence is limited and it does not have
a shoreline on the Arctic Ocean, there are growing interactions between the Arctic
region and the European territory. Three of the EU member states, Denmark
(through Greenland), Finland and Sweden, have territories lying in the Arctic circle.
Iceland and Norway are not members of the EU but they are members of the
European Economic Area. In many international policy areas that are relevant for
the Arctic, the EU holds shared competence with the member states and coordinates
the positions of the member states in international negotiations. Therefore, the EU
has influence on the socio-economic and environmental issues of the region, and
has been engaged in the European Arctic cooperation since mid-1990s
The European Parliament has called for speciﬁc EU Arctic policies in order to
increase the role that the EU can play in the region. Changing climate and economic
forces are recognized as relevant factors behind the development of EU´s policy
interest (Koivurova et al. 2011). Greenland, a strategic area for future development,
is of special importance for the EU. And Russia plays a key role for various
initiatives especially in energy security matters in Europe. The EU recognizes the
cooperation work carried out by the Arctic Council and it is committed to
UNCLOS. In 2009, an application was submitted by the European Commission to
become a permanent observer to the Arctic Council. However, the Council showed
reluctance to the application questioning whether the EU has or should have any
role.
3.3 Strategic Synthesis: Importance of the Arctic,
Common Goods Governance, Role of Russia
It is crucial to support the socio-economic development of the Arctic communities
in the phase of severe environmental changes, because, in the same time: (i) climate
change should be dealt with immediately and on the long run, and (ii) it is important
to pay special attention to the Northern communities as they face urgent devel-
opment problems related to population decline, poor health status and migration.
The guiding question is about retaining not only the economic, but also the social
and environmental capital of the territory as nations compete for ownership of the
natural resources. It is of utmost importance to ensure good governance under this
high degree of uncertainty.
Since the large energy companies (with many being in state ownership), ﬁshing
interests, shipping companies as well as tourist business will grow, and with the
opening of the Northwest Passage, commercial interests will increase dramatically.
The complex interaction among all these actors will have a big impact on the
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geopolitics of the neighbourhood. Thus it is integral that all the actors consider the
beneﬁts for the entire Northern neighbourhood in a cooperative environment and
not only their self-interest. It is of utmost importance that the notion of “common
goods” be largely applied to this neighbourhood’s resources, and paves the way for
modern post-national governance.
In this more and more strategic neighbourhood, the notion of regionalisation
(increasing flows and common stakes) might be an excellent driver for improved
regionalism. As countries outside of the region are competing for access to a type of
territorial capital that has traditionally been a common good rather than a strict
jurisdictional territory, a neighbourhood’s common legal framework will be needed,
for instance, so as to attract international investment in a sustainable way and turn
regional challenges into opportunities.
There are platforms on which cooperation on the Northern neighbourhood can
develop, ranging from the interregional (e.g. the Barents cooperation) to the global
(e.g. Arctic work in the International Maritime Organisation, IMO). The Arctic
Council is so far the most important pan-Arctic forum. This is proven by the
interests shown by the EU and China gain permanent observer status. However,
since the decisions taken at the Council are not binding, it is up to discussion if the
Council can play a direct role in Arctic governance in the future. On the other hand,
the Council is well equipped to provide and build the knowledge that is important
for facilitating multi-level cooperation on certain areas, especially security and
rescue.
A difﬁculty emerges from the fact that the European part of the Northern
neighbourhood belongs to various European territorial cooperation programmes:
the Cross Border Cooperation (ENPI CBC) programme Kolarctic-Russia, the
Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme 2014–2020 for the Westnorden, the
Northern Dimension (a joint policy between the European Union, Russia, Norway
and Iceland). Also the new self-government agreement in Greenland from 2009
may have some effects as Greenland took over i.e. responsibility for the mineral
resource and in the existing EU-Greenland partnership Agreement the focus was
changed from a ﬁshery agreement to a partnership agreement with special focus on
education. Lastly, countries of the region, including the EU countries, have either
published their Arctic strategies during the last years or have a strategy that is under
construction. This calls for a more uniﬁed and ambitious EU strategy on this
neighbourhood.
It has to be emphasized that Russia is one of the key stakeholders in the Northern
neighbourhood. Moreover, before the Ukrainian crisis there were negotiations on a
New EU-Russia Agreement. The border agreement with Norway points to a
direction that calls for stability and peaceful development in the region (e.g. the
border delimitation agreement, dividing in fair terms, signed between Russia and
Norway in the Barents and Polar Seas). This should be followed up as a good
example for the future development of the region.
With regard to territorial institutional structures, the Northern Partnership is one
of the primary initiatives in the area to address common challenges with regard to
cross-border cooperation and external policies among the Nordic Countries, the
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Baltic States and Russia—the Northern Dimension forms an important venue for
dialogue with the Russian neighbour. The goal is to promote development and
security in a number of areas—economic, social, environmental, judicial and
regional development. Several different types of partnership agreements were cre-
ated in the framework of the Northern Dimension: the NDEP (environmental
issues), the NDPHS (public health and social wellbeing), the NDPC (culture) and
the NDPTL (transport and logistics). The ND Institute (NDI) and ND Business
Council (NDBC) were been created, along with an ‘Arctic Window’ to focus
attention on the region (Fig. 3.1).
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